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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MYRON BROUGH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RAMON R. APPAWORA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14434 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TO: The Honorable Members of the Supreme Court of Utah: 
Pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Appellant, Ramon R. Appawora, respectfully petitions 
the Court to grant a rehearing in the above entitled case. The 
appellant is not unmindful of the general reluctance of the Court 
to hear the continued protestations of disappointed parties, 
but appellant respectfully submits that the impact of the majority 
decision is so great, the conclusion reached is so untenable, and 
that the underlying assumed facts not in evidence are so far from 
the truth, that it is appropriate for the Court to grant a re-
hearing herein. 
/ 
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The grounds for this petition are that the majority 
has made numerous findings in support of its conclusions which 
are without substance and contrary to fact. In order of their 
appearance in the majority opinion, they are as follows: 
1. The majority opinion states that the defendant 
claims that the reservation encompasses all lands "within the 
drainage of the Duchesne River from the snowcapped mountains on 
the north to the snowcapped mountains on the south," when in fact 
this language is taken from page 5 of plaintiff's brief, quoting 
an unnamed "layman." Defendant claims that the Uintah reservation 
in question was created and defined by the Executive Order of 
October 3, 1861 and confirmed by the Act of May 5, 1864 (13 Stat. 
63) . 
2. The majority opinion states that the Ute Tribe's 
reservation was set apart by treaty "with the ancestors of this 
defendant," when in fact no such treaty exists relating to the 
Uintah Reservation and no treaty rights have been or could be 
asserted by defendant. The reservation was created by the 
President and Congress as indicated next above. 
3. The majority opinion states that "with the advance 
of civilization and the increase in population, it was considered 
advisable" to sell Indian Lands, when in fact the federal govern-
ment's Indian allotment policy between 1887 and 1934 was to make 
allotments to Indians and, with the consent of the Indians, to open 
their reservations to non-Indian settlement while at the same time 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
preserving the existence of the reservations. See Moe v. Salish 
and Kootenai Tribes, U.S. , 48 L.Ed. 2d 96, 109, 96 S.Ct. 
(1976) . 
4. The majority opinion states that the "remaining land" 
not "chosen" by the Indians (allotted lands), "was sold to the govern-
ment," when in fact the lands were sold to homesteaders with the funds 
derived therefrom held in trust for the benefit of the Tribe. Bene-
ficial title to unallotted lands not sold to homesteaders remained 
at all times in the Indians. See Hanson v. U.S., 153 F.2d 162 
(10th Cir. 1946) and Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159, 64 L.Ed. 
507, 40 S.Ct. 241 (1920). 
5. The majority opinion states that Theodore Roosevelt's 
proclamation in 1905 "placed the land of the Indian reservation 
not theretofore allotted to Indians back on the public domain," 
when in fact that proclamation did no more than open such unallotted 
lands to limited entry under the homestead and townsite laws of the 
United States. See 34 Stat. 3119. 
6. The majority opinion states that "Congress appro-
priated funds to pay for the land thus transferred, and the 
Indians accepted the money," when in fact the statute footnoted did 
no more than appropriate $70,064.48 to pay the Uintah and White 
River Indians for allotments made on their reservation to 
other Indians. No money was appropriated to pay for lands opened 
to non-Indian settlement. See 32 Stat. 245,263. 
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7. The majority opinion states that, by receiving judg-
ment funds for the loss of reservation lands in Colorado, "the 
Indians lost all rights which they or their ancestors ever had 
in or to the land not theretofore allocated to them," when in fact 
there is no legal or factual connection between the payment of 
those funds and the present or past rights of the Ute Indians 
in the Uintah Reservation of Utah* 
8. The majority opinion states that "No longer can an 
Indian migrant carry about him a protecting mantle which makes him 
immune to the law of the land", when in fact the Ute Indians on their 
reservation are now and always have been subject to both federal 
and tribal laws which are the "law of the land." The so-called 
"migrant Indians" had resided in the Uintah Basin since time 
immemorial and were officially settled there more than 50 years 
before the first non-Indians. 
9. The majority opinion stresses that "the government 
has altered its general policy toward the Indian tribes" and no longer 
regards them as "sovereign nations," yet the court chooses to ignore 
the fact that the Congress and the Courts have consistently recog-
nized that 
Indian tribes are unique aggregations 
possessing attributes of sovereignty 
over both their members and their terri-
tory, ***; they are "a separate people" 
possessing "the power of regulating 
their internal and social relations." 
U.S.,v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 42 
L.Ed. 2d 706, 95 S.Ct. 710 (1975). 
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This case also recognized the appropriateness of tribal courts 
hearing cases involving non-Indians. See also the Indian Self-
Determination Act of 1975 (25 U.S.C. Section 450 et seg.). 
10. The majority opinion states that "The Ute nation, 
of the long-ago treaty, no longer exists," when in fact the Ute 
Indian Tribe is alive and well, organized under federal law and 
expressly recognized by both the Congress of the United States 
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See Record, page 20. 
11. The majority opinion states that Ute Indians "are 
now citizens of the United States" and that "when a nation ceases 
to exist, its treaties are no longer of any force or effect," 
when in fact Indian citizenship is undisputed. The defendant 
makes no claim to any treaty rights nor has he expressed unwilling-
ness to accept the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, 
but merely claims the right to have this action enforced in 
the proper forum. 
12. The majority opinion relies on the decision of 
De Coteau v. District Court as support for its conclusion, when 
in fact that decision involves a radically different legislative 
fact situation involving a South Dakota Indian reservation in 
which the Indians voluntarily sold and ceded land by agreement 
and which, by comparison, indicates the completely inappropriate 
nature of the conclusion reached in the majority opinion. 
13. The majority opinion states "To declare the law 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
to be as claimed by the appellant would be to abandon all forms 
of due process and permit an enrolled Indian to commit crimes 
or torts at will and be immune from any accountability to the 
law of the land/1 when in fact defendant has urged only that 
the instant matter not be heard in State Court conceding that 
jurisdiction would lie in the Ute Tribal Court, a forum made 
expressly subject to the due process standard by the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (25 U.S.C. Section 1302(8)). An 
Indian is accountable in federal court for major felony crimes, 
including murder (See 18 U.S.C. Section 1153) and is accountable 
to the Ute Tribal Court for all other crimes as well as civil 
liability. 
15. The majority opinion states that "to permit an 
Indian who commits a murder . . . to show disdain for the pro-
secuting officials and claim the sanctuary of the tribal method 
of procedure is unthinkable," when in fact this unfounded 
hypothetical situation is squarely within the exclusive juris-
diction of the United States under 18 U.S.C. Section 1153. 
Based on these erroneous assumptions, the majority 
opinion reaches the completely unwarranted conclusion that the 
Ute Indian Tribe's reservation has been terminated, its govern-
mental existence extinguished, and that, as a result, its 
members are subject to state court jurisdiction. The following 
brief will demonstrate that this result should be reconsidered 
by further hearing. 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Statement of Facts 
The facts actually before the court have been set 
forth in defendant's previous briefs and noted in the dissenting 
opinion. The serious factual misstatements upon which the majority 
opinion is erroneously based have been enumerated above. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE MAJORITY OPINION'S JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
FEDERAL LAW RELATING TO THE PRESENT STATUS 
OF THE UTE TRIBE'S RESERVATION WAS DEFICIENT, 
INCOMPLETE, AND IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE 
RULES OF THIS COURT. 
The majority opinion has apparently circumvented the 
requirements of both federal (see 25 U.S.C. Section 1321 et seq.) 
and Utah State law (see Section 63-36-9 el: seq.) by holding that 
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation has been terminated, that the Ute 
Tribe possesses no governmental or judicial powers, and that 
the members of the Ute Tribe are entitled to no rights as 
reservation Indians therein. 
The majority opinion cites only the meager authority 
of one federal statute and one presidential proclamation as jus-
tification for its conclusion that Congress has somehow ter-
minated the Ute Tribe's reservation and perhaps its very exis-
tence as well. (See footnotes 1 and 2 in the majority opinion.) 
The majority opinion has overlooked or failed to consider a 
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staggering number of additional statutes and authorities which 
have provided both legislative and judicial recognition of 
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, and the Ute Indian Tribe 
from 1861 to the present day. 
According to the case of De Coteau v. District County 
Court, 420 U.S. 425, 43 L.Ed.2d 300, 95 S.Ct. 1082 (1975), upon 
which decision the majority opinion relies, in order to deter-
mine the existence of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, this 
Court must consider the following criteria to which are footnoted 
a representative sample of the statutes and authorities which 
the Court has either overlooked or failed to consider: the crea-
tion of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 1/; Congressional treat-
ment of the reservation prior to 1902 2/; Congressional Acts 
specifically dealing with the making of allotments to the Ute 
Indians and the opening of the reservation to non-Indian settle-
ment - 1902 to 1905 3/' Congressional recognition of the reser-
Footnote 1: See the Executive Order of October 3, 1861 
(I Kappler 900); Act of May 5, 1864 (13 Stat. 63); Executive 
Order of January 5, 1882 (I Kappler 901); Act of March 11, 
1948 (62 Stat. 72). 
Footnote 2: See e.g., Act of February 8, 1887 (24 Stat. 388); 
Act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 548; Act of May 24, 1888 (25 
Stat. 157); Act of August 15, 1894 (28 Stat. 286, 337); Act of 
June 10, 1896 (29 Stat. 321, 341-2); Act of June 7, 1897 (30 
Stat. 62, 87); Act of June 4, 1898 (30 Stat. 429); Act of 
March 1, 1899 (30 Stat. 924, 941). 
Footnote 3: Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263); Joint 
Resolution of June 19, 1902 (32 Stat. 744); Act of March 3, 
1903 (32 Stat. 982, 997); Act of April 21, 1904 (33 Stat. 189, 
207); Act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat. 1048, 1069); Proclamation 
of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119). 
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vation from 1905 to the present 4/; administrative treatment 
of the reservation by the Department of the Interior subsequent 
to 1905 5/; and other judicial authorities recognizing the 
continued existence of the Ute Tribe1s Reservation 6/. 
The majority opinion has misconstrued and overlooked 
these material authorities which were not heretofore presented 
because the issue of reservation status was not and is not before 
the Court and the majority opinion's decision in this regard was 
not reasonably foreseeable. 
Since judicial notice has already been taken of 
materials not in the record, defendant submits that it is 
particularly important that a rehearing be granted and that 
Footnote 4: See e.g., Act of April 4, 1910 (36 Stat. 269, 
284); Act of March 11, 1948 (62 Stat. 72); Act of March 10, 
1950 (64 Stat. 19); Act of August 27, 1954 (68 Stat. 868); 
Act of August 9, 1955 (69 Stat. 544); Act of July 14, 1956 
(70 Stat. 546); Act of August 2, 1956 (70 Stat. 936); Act 
of September 14, 1961 (75 Stat. 916); Act of September 18, 
1970 (84 Stat. 843). 
Footnote 5: See e.g., Secretarial Order of August 25, 1945 
(10 Fed. Reg. 12409); Public Land Order of October 1, 1959 
(24 Fed. Reg. 8175); Public Land Order of February 21, 1961 
(26 Fed. Reg. 1718); Secretarial Order of October 1, 1971 
(36 Fed. Reg. 19920). 
Footnote 6: See e.g., State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P. 
2d 741 (1945); Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d 162 (10th 
Cir. 1946); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 
U.S. 128, 31 L.Ed.2d 741, 92 S.Ct. 1456 (1972); The Ute 
Indian Tribe v. State Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 
No.C.-74-183, D. Utah, Central Div., Judgment dated February 
25, 1976 (appeal docketed, U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
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/ 
additional judicial notice be taken of the matters indicated 
in this brief, particularly in light of the requirement of Rule 
12(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence which requires that: 
A...reviewing court taking judicial 
notice of matter not theretofore so noticed 
in the action shall afford the parties 
reasonable opportunity to present infor-
mation relevant to the propriety of 
taking such judicial notice and to the 
tenor of the matter to be noticed. 
(Emphasis added). 
Point II 
THE MAJORITY OPINION UNLAWFULLY DEPRIVES 
APPELLANT OF RIGHTS ACCORDED AND GUARAN-
TEED HIM BY STATE AND FEDERAL LAW. 
A. APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER 25 U.S.C. 
SECTION 1321 ET SEQ. AND SECTION 
63-36-9 ET SEQ. U.S.C. 1953, HAVE 
BEEN HELD TO VIOLATE THE DUE PRO-
CESS CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND 
UTAH CONSITUTIONS. 
25 U.S.C. Section 1321 el; seq. and Section 63-36-9 
et seq. U.C.A. 1953, each quarantee that reservation Indians shall 
not be subject to state court jurisdiction unless the consent 
provisions of 25 U.S.C. Section 1326 and Section 63-36-10 U.C.A. 
1953, have been complied with. The record herein clearly states 
that the Ute Indians have never given such consent to the assump-
tion of Utah State jurisdiction. See Record, page 21. 
The majority opinion declares that these statutes, 
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assuring tribal court jurisdiction over reservation Indians 
must be unconstitutional. 
Any statute or court decision which 
would prevent an enrolled Indian from 
being tried under the law of the land 
for a tort or crime committed by that 
Indian would be in contravention of 
the due process clause of the Consti-
tution. Majority Opinion, page 2 
(Emphasis added). 
By so holding, the majority has apparently overlooked the decision 
of the U.S. Supreme Court expressly approving and enforcing the 
federal procedures for state assumption of jurisdiction, 25 U.S.C. 
Section 1321 ei: seq. (see Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 
400 U.S. 423, 27 L.Ed. 2d 507, 91 S.Ct. 480 (1971)), and the re-
quirement under Utah law that the Attorney General be served 
and given an opportunity to be heard whenever it is asserted 
that a state statute is invalid (see Section 78-33-11 U.C.A. 
1953) . 
B. APPELLANT'S RIGHTS AS AN ENROLLED 
MEMBER OF THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE 
RESIDING ON THE UINTAH AND OURAY 
RESERVATION HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED 
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS• 
As a reservation Indian, appellant has at least the 
following recognized rights and immunities: immunity from state 
income taxation (McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 
164, 36 L.Ed.2d 129, 93 S.Ct. 1257 (1973); immunity from sales 
taxation (Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 
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sso U.S. 685, 14 L.Ed.2d 165, 85 S.Ct. 1242 (1965)); immunity 
from personal property taxation (Moe v. Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes, U.S. , 48 L.Ed.2d 96, 96 S.Ct. (1976)); the 
right of tribal self-determination (see 25 U.S.C. Section 
450 et. seq.) ; and the right to participate in tribal economic 
resources (see 25 U.S.C. Section 677 et seq.). 
The majority opinion runs directly contrary to the 
well established and oft repeated rule stated as follows: 
It is thoroughly established that Congress 
has plenary authority over the Indians 
and all their tribal relations, and full 
power to legislate concerning their tribal 
property. 
Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391-2, 65 
L.Ed. 684, 41 S.Ct. 342 (1921). 
The Supreme Court has further recently noted that 
a holding favoring federal jurisdiction 
is required unless Congress has expressly 
or by clear implication diminished the 
boundaries of the reservation opened to 
settlement (emphasis in original). 
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505, 37 
L.Ed. 2d 92, 93 S.Ct. 2245 (1973). 
Further contravened by the majority opinion is the 
established rule that, 
when Congress has once established a 
reservation, all tracts included within 
it remain a part of the reservation un-
til separated therefrom by Congress. 
U.S. v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285, 
54 L.Ed. 195, 30 S.Ct. 93 (1909). 
Given the clear status of the record establishing that 
the accident in question occurred within the exterior boundaries 
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of the existing Uintah and Ouray Reservation, as well as estab-
lishing the defendant's enrollment status in the Ute Tribe, the 
majority opinion's contrary conclusions based upon no record at 
all, constitute an unlawful usurpation of the congressional 
prerogative. 
The majority opinion's reliance upon the distinguished 
authority of American Jurisprudence Second to terminate appellant's 
reservation requires us to supply the court with this further 
authority from that same source. 
The jurisdiction of the Federal Govern-
ment over Indian tribes and over the mem-
bers of such tribes while they are on 
Indian Reservations being exclusive, 
such Indians, while they are on their 
reservations, cannot be controlled or 
governed by the laws of the states within 
which the reservations are located. *** 
Nor can the state courts assume juris-
diction of a controversy involving Indians, 
where such controversy arose out of a 
transaction occurring on the reservation. 
63 Am Jur 2d Indians, Section 63. (Emphasis added) 
C. THE MAJORITY OPINION HAS DENIED APPEL-
LANT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The majority opinion itself denies appellant his 
right to due process of law in at least two ways: (1) The opinion 
denies to appellant the right to have this action heard in 
tribal court, the only forum having jurisdiction under both 
state and federal law; and (2) It further, denies him of this right 
without ever having given him notice or an opportunity to be 
heard herein on the issue upon which the majority opinion is 
based. 
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The case of Williams v, Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 3 L.Ed.2d 
251, 79 S.Ct. 269 (1959) denied to the courts of the State of 
Arizona any civil jurisdiction over a reservation Indian for 
a cause of action arising on the Indian's reservation. Like 
the instant case, that case involved a non-Indian plaintiff. 
The Supreme Court recognized the defendant Indian's right 
to have the action heard in his tribal court. 
There can be no doubt that to allow 
the exercise of state jurisdiction here 
would undermine the authority of the 
tribal courts over Reservation affairs 
and hence would infringe on the right of 
the Indians to govern themselves. It is 
immaterial that respondent is not an 
Indian. He was on the Reservation and 
the transaction with an Indian took 
place there. 358 U.S. at 223. 
Not only has the majority taken this right away from 
appellant, they have taken it away by deciding this case on an 
issue not argued, briefed or raised by the pleadings or else-
where in this Court or the District Court below. Appellant's 
due process rights have been violated both because of the 
arbitrary nature of the decision and because he had been given 
neither notice of the surprise nature of the decision nor an 
opportunity to be heard thereon. 
Point III 
THE MAJORITY OPINION'S RELIANCE UPON THE 
DE COTEAU DECISION IS MISPLACED AND UN-
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The De Coteau decision recites the strict criteria which 
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must be met in reaching the conclusion that an Indian reservation 
has been disestablished by Congress. 
This Court does not lightly conclude 
that an Indian reservation has been 
terminated. "(W)hen Congress has once 
established a reservation all tracts 
included within it remain a part of the 
reservation until separated therefrom by 
Congress." (Citation). The congressional 
intent must be clear, to overcome "the 
general rule that f(d)oubtful expressions 
are to be resolved in favor of the weak 
and defenseless people who are the wards 
of the nation, dependent upon its protec-
tion and good faith.1" (Citation) Accord-
ingly, the Court requires that the "con-
gressional determination to terminate ... 
be expressed on the face of the Act or 
be clear from the surrounding circum-
stances and legislative history." (Cita-
tions) In particular, we have stressed 
that reservation status may survive the 
mere opening of a reservation to settle-
ment, even when the moneys paid for the - « 
land by the settlers are placed in trust 
by the Government for the Indians1 bene-
fit. (Citations) 
De Coteau v. District County Court, 420 
U.S. 425, 444, 43 L.Ed. 2d 300, 95 S.Ct. 
1082 (1975). 
A reading of the De Coteau decision, together with the 
Supreme Court's prior reservation status decision in the case 
of Mattz v. Arnett, supra, reveals that the U.S. Supreme Court 
requires a thorough and detailed examination of all aspects 
of the legislative, administrative and even social history surround-
ing a reservation before passing upon its current status. By 
comparison, the majority opinion herein is embarrassingly deficient. 
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Further, the operative historical facts in the De Coteau 
case are radically different from those surrounding the Uintah 
Reservation, which facts this court has never reviewed in any 
meaningful way. Indeed, the De Coteau decision would not sup-
port the conclusion of reservation disestablishment for the 
Uintah Reservation even if the facts were as they have been 
grossly misstated in the majority opinion. 
The De Coteau decision did not mark a departure by 
the Supreme Court from its previous opinions on Indian reser-
vation status. On the contrary, the Supreme Court expressly 
affirmed its prior holdings in the cases of Seymour v. Super-
intendent, 368 U.S. 351, 7 L.Ed.2d 346, 82 S.Ct. 424 (1962) and 
Mattz v. Arnett, supra. 
The majority opinion of this Court places great signi-
ficance upon the payment factor. The payment scheme for lands 
opened to homesteading under the Act of May 27, 1902, for the 
Uintah Reservation was not materially different from the schemes 
found in Mattz and Seymour. The majority opinion then compounds 
its factual errors by asserting that payments made to certain 
Ute Indians for loss of a Colorado reservation somehow affects 
the status of the Uintah Reservation in Utah. This is, of 
course, a non sequitur. The Colorado dealings had no effect on 
the Uintah Reservation except to resettle certain Ute Indians 
thereon. The majority opinion, in the same paragraph, digresses 
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from a discussion of payment for Colorado lands to the conclusion 
that Ute Indians in Utah lost all rights to their Uintah Reser-
vation as a result thereof. Neither the historical facts nor 
logic support this conclusion. 
Even assuming that the majority opinion had accurately 
stated historical facts showing that the government had paid the 
Indians for unallotted lands opened to non-Indians, this factor 
would not require or even justify reaching the conclusion 
that the Ute Indians have lost all interests in the Uintah Reser-
vation. An Indian reservation, like a state or a country, is a 
jurisdictional boundary. There is no dispute that the Ute In-
dians do not own all of the land within the Uintah Reservation. 
But neither does the State of Utah own all of the land in the 
State of Utah. 
Ownership of the fee title to land is essentially 
irrelevant to the question of governmental jurisdiction over the 
land. That jurisdiction depends upon other factors such as those 
established for an Indian reservation at Section 63-36-9 et; seq. 
U.C.A. 1953. The De Coteau and other cited decisions clearly 
recognize and expressly hold that an Indian reservation can 
and often does continue to exist following the opening of the 
reservation to non-Indian settlement and the payment of the 
Indians for the lands so disposed. Indeed, the Utah Code it-
self likewise so recognizes at Section 63-36-18, which defines 
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an Indian reservation as including fee patented and right-of-
way lands within the reservation. 
T
^
e D e
 Coteau decision considered two lower court cases 
which had reached opposite conclusions regarding whether or not 
the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation had been terminated by an 
1891 Act of Congress. This 1891 Act ratified an agreement made 
with the Indians by which the Indians expressly agreed to "cede, 
sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all of the 
unallotted land within the reservation." (Emphasis added) 
The agreement further provided for the payment of a sum certain 
for each acre of "the land ceded/' (420 U.S. at 437). This 
agreement had been signed "by the required majority of the male 
adult tribal members" apparently in conformity to the consent 
requirement of the General Allotment Act. (420 U.S. at 436). 
A spokesman for the Tribe was reported as saying, "We are willing 
the surplus land should be sold. We don't expect to keep reserva-
tion." The record further showed "that the Indians wished to sell 
outright all of their unallotted lands" (420 U.S. 434-5). 
Following the signing of the agreement, it was sub-
mitted by the President to Congress. The decision notes that 
each of the several committee reports which commented on the 
Agreement recognized that it effected 
a simple and unqualified cession of 
the unallotted lands to the United 
States for a sum certain. (420 U.S. 
at 438) . 
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Congress included its ratification of the agreement in a compre-
hensive act which also ratified several other agreements providing 
for the "outright cession" of surplus reservation lands to the 
government. Indeed, the Act, like the agreement itself, used 
the language of "ceded, sold, relinquished and conveyed to the 
United States" to describe the effect of the agreement on the 
reservation lands. 
Contrasting the finding in De Coteau with the facts 
of the instant case, the chief distinguishing factor is the nature 
and substance of the Acts involved. Whereas in De Coteau, the 
Congress was merely ratifying an agreement to which a majority 
of male adult tribal members had signed and by which they expressly 
agreed to "cede, sell, relinquish and convey" their interest 
to the United States, the relevant acts affecting the Ute's 
reservation were but unilateral acts of Congress, containing 
no express language of cession, and providing that the consent 
of the Indians was to be obtained. 
The compensation scheme in the Ute Acts was similar 
to that found in the Mattz and Seymour cases, providing that 
"the uncertain future proceeds of settler purchases should be 
applied to the Indians1 benefit" (De Coteau, 420 U.S. at 448), 
rather than "a straightforward agreement ceding lands to the 
government for a sum certain" (Ixi.) as was the case in De Coteau. 
The Ute Indians were not only not willing to agree to the disposal 
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of their lands, they refused specific and repeated efforts by 
the government to get them to consent. They did not expect 
that Congress would or could dispose of their lands without 
their consent because they had been repeatedly assured that 
the government would not do so. The Ute Acts do not show on 
their face, nor does the congressional history of the Ute Acts 
present a clear recognition of intent to terminate the Ute's 
reservation. 
T
^
e D e
 Coteau decision is important to the proper 
decision of this case to show, by contrast with the majority 
opinion, what the U.S. Supreme Court requires in the way of clear, 
express congressional intent to terminate an Indian reservation. 
The marked difference in the De Coteau facts and the instant 
case, by way of operative legislative language, clearly expressed 
congressional intent, and clearly established Indian assent and 
intent, demonstrates that a finding of disestablishment would 
be contrary to established principles of law and contrary to the 
facts appearing in the record of the case as well as the his-
torical record. The relevant facts of this case are more nearly 
identical to those of the Seymour and Mattz cases which rejected 
reservation termination, and which cases were expressly reaffirmed 
by the Court in De Coteau. 
CONCLUSION 
A rehearing is necessary herein to allow the appellant 
the opportunity, required by a rule of this Court (U.R.E. Rule 12(4)), 
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to respond to matters judicially noticed for the first time in 
the majority opinion. Appellant has shown that there is a great 
mass of material which has not been considered and which is 
essential for consideration if this Court is to persist in 
disposing of this case on the unbriefed, unargued and "not 
raised by the pleadings" issue of reservation status. 
On the basis of the foregoing, a rehearing is res-
pectfully requested. 
Dated: (jUiMl^ Mt WVh 
BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY & HOWARD 
F. Burton Howard 
Scott C. Pugsley 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
1000 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-0800 
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